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ABSTRACT In politics ÒsoftÓ ideational factors are often dismissed in favor of ÒhardÓ 
quantifiable data. Since the Òmemory boom,Ó however, collective memory has become an 
important variable for explaining persistent grievances and cycles of hatred. Building on the 
work of Hannah Arendt and the first generation of the Frankfurt School, I seek to 
counterbalance the literatureÕs predominantly negative conception of memory by developing a 
constructive understanding of remembrance as a resource for rethinking politics in the 
aftermath of breaks in the narrative thread of historical time. My basic thesis is that historical 
ruptures shared by an entire generation can activate collective memory as a resource for 
reimagining political life. I show how Arendt and the critical theorists of the early Frankfurt 
School used the caesura of 1945 to rethink the meaning of the past and endorse new forms of 
political life in the aftermath of EuropeÕs age of total war. 
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Time present and time past 
Are both perhaps present in time future 
And time future contained in time past. 
If all time is eternally present 
All time is unredeemable. 
- T.S. Eliot, ÒBurnt NortonÓ (1936) 
 
Introduction 
In politics ÒsoftÓ ideational factors are often dismissed in favor of ÒhardÓ quantifiable 
data. Since the Òmemory boom,Ó however, collective memory has become an important 
variable for explaining persistent historical grievances. For example, while it is possible to 
understand the Eurozone crisis using quantifiable variables, this approach cannot explain why 
Ò[h]ardly a day goes by without [German] Chancellor Angela Merkel being depicted in a Nazi 
uniformÓ (Fleischhauer, 2012) or why many Greeks see the crisis as a German attempt to 
Òoccupy Greece through the economyÓ (Norris, 2011). While material factors are important, 
their meaning is determined by references to narratives about the past.  
These frameworks of remembrance influence contemporary events by shaping the 
historic analogies that help individuals to interpret and understand the present (Khong, 1992). 
Unfortunately, collective memory can also turn the past into a Weberian Òiron cageÓ 
(stahlhartes Gehuse). If every choice can be tied to a past trigger, then individuals are caught 
in never-ending causal chains. These considerations have led many scholars to focus on the 
Òsins of memoryÓ (Schacter, 2001) and on how past grievances drive recurring Òcycles of 
hatredÓ (Minow, 2002).  
I seek to supplement this predominant ÒnegativeÓ reading with a more Òpositive,Ó 
constructive interpretation of collective memory as a resource for social and political 
transformation (Knig, 2008: 23-31). I draw on Hannah Arendt and the first generation of the 
Frankfurt School, especially Max Horkheimer, Theodor Adorno, Walter Benjamin and 
Herbert Marcuse, to develop this argument. In my necessarily brief reconstructions of these 
thinkers, collective memory emerges as a resource for rethinking the foundations of political 
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life in the aftermath of traumatic social ruptures. In the course of what I call Ònormal politics,Ó 
collective memory is largely defined by stasis. Established interests, institutions, habits and 
traditions make change difficult as forward-looking narratives flow logically from past events. 
However, experiences that force individuals to question the underlying structures of society 
create a rupture in existing narratives. By breaking causal chains, such disruptions make 
Òparadigm shiftsÓ possible (Kuhn 1962), allowing the past to be reconstructed in new ways. 
The argument begins with an explanation of my choice of theoretical resources to 
develop this account of collective memory. A reconstruction of the ontology of remembrance 
follows in part two. In the third section, I examine how societies harness and preserve the 
constructive power of memory through institutions and law, as well as through social norms 
and traditions. This leads into a discussion of historical crises as the foundation for a 
constructive understanding of memory that builds on the concept of rupture. I then turn to the 
question of agency, outlining the role of political generations in understanding such historical 
breaks by drawing on examples from the Second World War in Europe. The conclusion 
considers how their interpretation of the events leading up to 1945 led Arendt and the thinkers 
of the Frankfurt School to consider and endorse new forms of political life after the war. 
 
Memory and Rupture in Postwar German Thought 
It is somewhat counterintuitive to seek a constructive reading of memory in postwar 
German social and political theory. However, the firsthand experience of violence and 
atrocity forced intellectuals like Arendt, Benjamin, Horkheimer, Adorno and Marcuse to 
consider how a past that included two World Wars and the death chambers at Auschwitz 
could be used to build a better future, instead of merely repeating the horrors of the past. My 
use of these thinkers of Òdark timesÓ (Benhabib et al., 2010) is not meant to deny their deep 
philosophical Ð and in the case of Arendt and Adorno, deeply personal (Rensmann 2012) Ð 
disagreements. Since their work spans a range of topics and methods, this divergence is 
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hardly surprising. What is important for my argument is that in the aftermath of EuropeÕs age 
of total war these theorists agreed on the need to harness memory for constructive ends. 
The common thread running through their thought is a philosophical orientation defined 
by fear, i.e. of the need to avoid the evil that haunted Europe at the beginning of the twentieth 
century (Forst, 2013: 166). Not only were Arendt and the first generation of the Frankfurt 
School driven by the trauma of what they had witnessed; Òtheir reaction to the catastrophe of 
the twentieth century was a political as opposed to a theological or a merely philosophical 
oneÓ (Benhabib, 2011: 22). As a result, they all sought to stop the recurring cycles of violence 
in Europe by identifying how memory could fit into an emancipatory social and political 
theory. 
Although their lived experience was defined by catastrophe, none of these thinkers were 
overcome by their orientation to the summum malum (Shklar, 1998: 11). Instead, they clung to 
the possibility of redemption. The theoretical resources for this confidence came from 
Benjamin. Despite his broader theoretical pessimism, he also argued that it is Ò[o]nly for the 
sake of the hopeless ones [that] we have been given hopeÓ (2002: 356). 
Benjamin created a personal and a theoretical link between Arendt and the Frankfurt 
School. Due to his association with the Institute of Social Research (Institut fr 
Sozialforschung), BenjaminÕs connection to critical theory is clear. Although she was not 
affiliated with the Frankfurt Circle, ArendtÕs work represents Òthe critical political theory of 
the post-totalitarian momentÓ (Benhabib, 2003: xliv). After BenjaminÕs death these thinkers 
all took up his anamnestic form of Òredemptive criticismÓ (Habermas, 1979: 30-59), which 
focused on saving the treasures of the past in order to reappropriate them for a different 
future. 
The idea of crisis plays a crucial role in BenjaminÕs historiography. He argues that it is 
only in moments of profound dislocation, when events can no longer be subsumed into 
existing narratives, that submerged pearls from the past can be retrieved for the present. 
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Building on this insight, Arendt and the Frankfurt School argued that such ÒBenjaminian 
momentsÓ (Benhabib, 2012: 32-3) could break the seemingly inevitable link between the past 
and the present, rekindling hope for the future. This shared emphasis makes this constellation 
of thinkers fruitful for developing my positive understanding of memory in the aftermath of 
historical ruptures. 
A brief disclaimer regarding my interpretation of Arendt and the first generation of the 
Frankfurt School: my goal is neither full hermeneutic fidelity to their respective philosophical 
projects nor completeness as regards their theoretical differences. I merely draw on the work 
of these postwar German theorists to inspire a constructive understanding of the creative 
potential of memory in the aftermath of profound societal ruptures. In doing so, I uncover and 
draw attention to an interesting and often overlooked overlap in their otherwise divergent 
approaches to social and political theory. 
 
Individual and Collective Memory 
The social pressure to be a unique individual is one of the key markers of modernity. In 
traditional societies identity is determined by social position and family background. In the 
modern process of individuation, the autonomous actions of human beings are crucial to the 
maintenance of a coherent identity. These choices are rooted in the decisions of individuals, 
who maintain their identities by appropriating their actions and carrying them into the future. 
Since past decisions determine individuality in the present, the concept of life history takes on 
a central role (Kierkegaard, 1987: 216). These histories are preserved in memory. As a result, 
remembrance becomes Òan essential element of the finite historical being of manÓ (Gadamer, 
2004: 14). 
Memory is neither history, nor is it defined by the chronology of linear time. The 
concept of history comes from the Greek historia (ἱστορία), meaning inquiry or knowledge 
acquired by investigation. Whereas history is defined by the study of archival texts and 
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objects, memory comes Òfrom within.Ó It is an affective connection, Òa felt knowledge of 
recent eventsÓ (Kateb, 1998: viii), created by formative experiences in the life of the 
individual. Unlike history, memory refuses Òto keep the past in the past, to draw the line, as it 
were, that is constitutive of the modern enterprise of historiographyÓ (Spiegel, 2002: 162). 
Despite these conceptual differences, history and memory are difficult to separate in 
practice. The study of history can change an individualÕs remembrance, just as the personal 
experiences of historians affect their academic work. Communal understandings of the past 
can even cause individuals to remember events they never actually witnessed. Although 
memory is experienced as coming Òfrom within,Ó it can also be implanted Òfrom without.Ó  
The difficulties involved in separating memory from history highlight the close 
interaction between personal and collective memory. While individuals interpret raw 
experiences and give them meaning, society as a whole provides the frameworks that allow 
individuals to construct and maintain their identities. Arendt (1998: 181) describes the process 
through which persons situate themselves as a Òweb of relationships and enacted storiesÓ that 
bind the community together, while also enabling individuals to differentiate themselves from 
each other. 
Maurice Halbwachs, a student of mile Durkheim, developed the paradigm of 
collective memory (mmoire collective) in the aftermath of the Great War. Based on his 
observations of interwar Europe, he concludes that individual memories are inseparable from 
the frameworks of collective remembrance. Halbwachs (1925: 404) argues that personal 
identities are socially rediscovered (retrouve) and socially reconstructed (reconstruite). 
Social frameworks not only give meaning to individual memories; they also provide the broad 
historical imaginary that shapes the selection and interpretation of formative events. 
As a result of the interplay between individuals and society, similar processes occur at 
both levels. Just as modernity has pushed individuals to take responsibility for past selves by 
constructing coherent life histories, it has also demanded that communities incorporate the 
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past into their collective identities. In modern nation-states, it is no longer enough for the 
people to merely obey. Citizens also have to maintain a collective identity that enables them 
to act as coauthors of law. 
As experienced by human beings, historical processes are marked by a distinct 
temporality. Unlike linear time, memory does not take equal account of events happening at 
regular intervals. Instead it endows certain events with meaning while silencing or forgetting 
others. In contrast to positivistic approaches, remembrance emphasizes the importance of 
certain events that shape the perception of numerical facts. Crucial events, which Òunfol[d] 
within an irreversible linear time, [are] absorbed into cyclical, liturgical memoryÓ (Spiegel, 
2002: 152) that repeatedly revisits these experiences. Collective frameworks transform the 
chronos (κρόνος) of linear, chronological time into the kairos (καιρός) of circular, liturgical 
time, defined by the cyclical return and reenactment of decisive experiences. 
There are many ways to navigate between the Òspace of experience,Ó incorporated into 
the present through memory, and the Òhorizons of expectationsÓ individuals and communities 
project into the future (Koselleck, 1985: 2). Whereas experience is finite, expectations are less 
constrained, allowing individuals to see the momentum of the Òpast in the presentÓ pushing 
them into differently configured Òfutures in the present.Ó Memory is personal because it Òis 
bound up with social and political actions, with concretely acting and suffering human beings 
and their institutions and organizations.Ó 
Benjamin (1977: 159) developed the distinction between Òeveryday eventsÓ 
(Erlebnisse) and Òauthentic experiencesÓ (Erfahrungen) to separate formative occurrences 
from the minutiae of daily life. Everyday events form the primary data of the individual 
subject. They are defined by the continuous flow of time. By contrast, authentic experiences Ð 
Òformative eventsÓ in HalbwachsÕs terminology Ð are something the individual undergoes and 
Òwhich does not leave him who has it unchanged.Ó Unlike quotidian events, authentic 
experiences are not comprehended as separate occurrences. Instead, they are incorporated into 
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narratives that lie within liturgical time, helping individuals link the spaces of experience and 
horizons of expectation to the present. ÒWhat we call experience (Erfahrung)Éis a living 
historical process; and its paradigm is not the discovery of facts but the peculiar fusion of 
memory and expectation into the whole.Ó1 
Authentic experiences are always defined within communal frameworks, either because 
the experience is shared or because it is given meaning by the community. Formative 
experiences tie the individual to the community through social institutions and traditions. As 
Arendt (1977b: 5) points out, memory Òis helpless outside a pre-established framework of 
reference, and the human mind is only on the rarest occasions capable of retaining something 
which is altogether unconnected.Ó 
While individuals and communities quickly forget most events, authentic experiences 
are preserved and continue to define identity and affect action in the present. In addition to 
helping individuals form stable identities and connecting them to the other members of their 
community, existing institutions and traditions link them to their ancestors as well as the 
generations to come by giving the community a vertical, temporal dimension to go with the 
horizontal, social dimension of daily life. 
 
The Power of Memory 
Social power can be divided into at least two basic categories. The first is rooted in the 
ability of actors to achieve their ends despite the resistance of others. This kind of Òpower toÓ 
may be described as effective or strategic. The second focuses on power as a constructive 
force that defines an actor or group in a social setting. Unlike effective power, which is an 
instrument that agents possess and deploy, this form of Òpower withÓ is constructive or 
communicative; it is part of who they are (Saar, 2010: 9-12).2 
What I call Òtype 1 powerÓ dominates empirical approaches. In the words of Max 
Weber (1978: 53), it is defined by the likelihood that an agent can effect action within a social 
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relationship Òregardless of the basis on which this probability rests.Ó Weber applied this 
notion to the sphere of politics through the concept of rule (Herrschaft), which he defines as 
Òthe probability that a command with a given specific content will be obeyed by a given 
group of specific persons.Ó Although he mentions traditional and charismatic sources of 
authority, in modernity effective power is expressed through legal-rational institutions, where 
superiors are defined by their authority over subordinates (Weber, 1958: 295-301). 
Weber did not live to see how the new regimes of the interwar years would combine 
administration with the strategic power of a charismatic leader to create totalitarian political 
regimes. In the aftermath of this experience, the Frankfurt School criticized conceptions of 
power that legitimized such forms of domination (Beherrschung). They did so by placing the 
individual at the center of a critical theory of society, arguing that Òaiming for enlightenment 
is essentiallyÉ [a] turn toward the subjectÓ (Adorno, 1986: 128). 
Arendt drew on the past to theorize an account of constructive or Òtype 2 powerÓ in my 
terminology. Arendt develops an ontological account of the power of individuals Òacting in 
concert.Ó By acting in social settings, she contends that Òmen show who they are, reveal 
actively their unique personal identitiesÓ (1998: 179). This constructive account of power 
differs from effective power in a number of ways. The first is in its goals or ends. Instead of 
looking to the external world, the action generated by type 2 power is oriented towards other 
human beings. In addition to specifying the characteristics and capabilities of the unique 
individual, it is also the source of collective identity for groups who define themselves 
through Òaction in concert.Ó  
Second, this kind of power is nonviolent and non-instrumental. It is not applied by 
individuals, but arises among them. Constructive power is essentially dialogical. This 
differentiates power, which is communicative by definition, from force and violence, both of 
which rely on physical coercion. Lastly, type 2 power cannot be manifested in isolation. 
Appearing in the world depends on plurality, since individuals cannot assert a unique self 
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without others to identify ourselves both with and against. Constructive power is always 
relational. For Arendt (1998: 200), ÒPower is what keeps the public realm, the potential space 
of appearance between acting and speaking men in existence.Ó 
This account leads to a narrative model of Òidentity in action,Ó where individuals 
identify who they are as a result of what they say and do. Words are linked to deeds, as the 
account of any action requires the identification of a doer with intentions acting in a certain 
context. In addition to creating unique individuals, this process also identifies communities 
through narratives of collective action. Within these webs of intersecting narratives, coherent 
understandings of self and group identity depend on the ability to integrate various stories 
from different perspectives into meaningful historical accounts (Benhabib, 2003: 261). 
Constructive power is futile without memory. Speech and deeds leave nothing behind. 
The experience of action must be secured by Òthe saving power of remembrance, which helps 
us preserve what would otherwise be lost to timeÓ (Beiner, 1982: 155). Great words and 
deeds, such as PericlesÕ Funeral Oration or the heroic deeds of Achilles, would have been lost 
but for the human capacity for remembrance. ÒWithout remembranceÉthe living activities of 
action, speech, and thought would lose their reality at the end of each process and disappear 
as though they never had beenÓ (Arendt, 1998: 95). Memory is needed to sustain the 
constructive power of individuals and unique human beings within self-consciously defined 
communities. 
 
Preserving Memory in the World 
Memory is not the most reliable source of social influence. The fleeting nature of words 
and deeds gives constructive power a tragic quality, which Arendt (1998: 181) calls Òthe 
frailty of human affairs.Ó In order to be viable in the longue dure, memory and the narratives 
that sustain it must be encased within more permanent structures. 
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The fragility of constructive power defines the distinction between communicative and 
cultural memory (Assmann et al., 1983: 284). While both are socially mediated forms of 
collective remembrance, communicative memory depends on repeated retelling. Because oral 
traditions are difficult to maintain, especially when the stories run counter to dominant social 
narratives, communicative memory has a limited temporal horizon. By contrast, cultural 
memory has been bound to objects or practices, such as memorials, written texts or social 
practices. The transition between communicative and cultural memory is a two-stage process: 
ÒThe whole factual world of human affairs depends for its reality and its continued existence, 
first, upon the presence of others who have seen and heard and will remember, and, second, 
on the transformation of the intangible into the tangibility of thingsÓ (Arendt, 1998: 95). 
Whereas communicative memory participates only in the first step, cultural memory 
passes through both. The action remembered is no longer merely a product of the mind but 
has been reified into an artifact or performance in the world of human affairs. Individuals 
Òfabricate a memoryÓ (Arendt, 1977b: 64) to help them define their collective identity through 
collective symbols, sites and practices. Unlike the shifting horizon of communicative 
memory, the fateful events and objects of cultural memory are fixed in the historical timeline 
of a community. 
The preservation of the past is the essential function of the polity. The political 
community fabricates memory in a variety of ways, including Òthe mundane apparatus of 
bibliographical structureÓ (Waldron, 2000: 208) represented by governmental archives, serials 
and anthologies. Both legal and institutional regimes, as well as social norms and traditions, 
help to legitimize the polity by linking political authority to the action of the citizens in 
concert. As Halbwachs (1980: 296) observes, Ò[S]ocial organization gives a persistent 
framework into which all detailed recall must fit, and it very powerfully influences both the 
manner and matter of recall.Ó 
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Although they are more closely associated with the Weberian account of rule, 
institutions draw much of their legitimacy from their origins. This opens the possibility that 
the Janus-face of power can be brought together into a single visage. The anamnestic power 
preserved in institutions can be used to justify political order Ð and the presumably legitimate 
Òpower overÓ that some individuals have in the established system Ð in the present. By 
making decisions in the same institutions as their ancestors, members of the polity do not 
merely recall the past. They also legitimize the strategic power of the community. While 
constructive power is a potent force for change, in the long term it is harnessed as a 
mechanism to legitimize the application of effective power. 
This link is often drawn through legal regimes. From the narrow perspective of type 1 
power, positive law sets the boundaries of acceptable behavior, making living together 
possible. By ensuring the safety of its members, the political community guarantees that 
witnesses will be present to testify to action. Each generation modifies and adds to the 
existing structure of law through historically established and legitimized practices. Law is not 
only a creation of the present, but also of the past. Arendt (1998: 198) points out that the 
organization of the political community, Òphysiognomically guaranteed by its laws Ð lest the 
succeeding generations change its identity beyond recognition Ð is a kind of organized 
remembrance.Ó 
The traditional linking of nationalism to self-determination draws on the connection 
between the legitimacy of political institutions and the constructive power of narrative. The 
Peace of Westphalia laid the foundations for the modern state system by establishing the 
principle of internal and external sovereignty in the aftermath of the Thirty YearsÕ War (1618-
1648). In the nineteenth-century the state combined sovereign authority with the legitimacy 
provided by a common national heritage. The nation-state justified the effective power 
expressed in its institutions with the constructive power of nationalism, establishing national 
self-determination as the highest principle of modern politics. 
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The crucial role played by a shared conception of the past in the consolidation of the 
nation-state can be seen in the growing prestige and political importance of history. With the 
awakening of national communities, historians helped to forge the bonds of solidarity that 
would unify the ethnic nation with the political state, the national ethnos with the civic demos 
(White, 1973: 170-5). Along with cultural, literary and political actors they were able to create 
a mythic past that bound individuals who spoke different dialects, lived different lifestyles 
and had little in common together through a broadly-shared collective identity built on the 
past. 
Social norms and traditions are a second mechanism for preserving the fleeting power 
of collective action. At its most basic level, tradition represents that which is passed on from 
generation to generation. Adorno (1966: 63) points out this usually occurs within the family, 
which socializes individuals into practices at a young age, becoming part of what he calls 
Òunconscious memoryÓ (unbewu§te Erinnerung). 
In addition to helping individuals form stable identities and connecting them to the other 
members of their community, tradition links them to their ancestors and to posterity by giving 
the community a vertical, temporal dimension to go with the horizontal, social dimension. 
The polity unifies individuals not only with their contemporaries, but also with past and future 
members of the community. In this way, Ò[T]he history of each of our own lives is generally 
and characteristically embedded in and made intelligible in terms of the larger and longer 
histories of a number of traditionsÓ (MacIntyre, 1981: 222). 
 
Unleashing the Critical Power of Memory 
Maintaining a connection to the past through legal and institutional regimes, as well as 
social norms and traditions, is crucial to individual and group identity. However, this 
relationship is also potentially dangerous. While memory helps to create frameworks of 
reference, it can also act as a roadblock, limiting freedom of thought and of action. Adorno 
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(1998: 315) was particularly concerned by this dilemma in the aftermath of the Second World 
War, observing, ÒNo timely tradition exists to be summoned, but if all tradition is lost, then 
the march into inhumanity begins.Ó 
Adorno (1986: 124) responds to this problem by advocating for a Òworking through of 
the pastÓ (Aufarbeitung der Vergangenheit), instead of the Òempty, cold forgettingÓ that 
defined years immediately following the war in Germany. Although Aufarbeitung is usually 
rendered as Òcoming to terms with,Ó I prefer the translation Òworking throughÓ because it 
highlights the psychoanalytic connotations of this phrase. Adorno argues that Germans must 
bring to consciousness and actively deal with their memories of the gas chambers at 
Auschwitz, in order to avoid the repression that he believes damaged the social fabric of the 
early Federal Republic. Although he (1986: 115) notes that Germans Òwan[t] to be free of the 
past: rightly so,Ó it is impossible to simply evade these experiences, since they are Òstill so 
intensely alive.Ó The Òloss of historyÓ involved in repression has practical consequences for a 
newly democratic community that cannot recall its progenitors without suffering neurosis. It 
also has important ethical consequences: ÒThe murdered are to be cheated even out of the one 
thing that our powerlessness can grant them: remembranceÓ (1986: 117). 
As a result of these reflections, Adorno (1998: 318) called for Òa critical relationship 
towards tradition as the medium of its preservation.Ó Despite their other methodological and 
substantive disagreements, Arendt agreed with the first generation of the Frankfurt School on 
this point. Instead of settling into the Òmindless peace of complacencyÓ (Arendt, 1977a: 38), 
she argued that the past must be an object of consciousness, actively confronted and learned 
from. 
In developing their understanding of collective memory, Arendt and the thinkers of the 
Frankfurt School all drew on BenjaminÕs ÒTheses on the Philosophy of HistoryÓ (1940). 
These fragments are BenjaminÕs attempt to understand how human freedom can be saved 
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from teleological conceptions of history. He highlights two important characteristics of 
rupture (Bruch).  
First, Benjamin illustrates how rupture forces individuals and communities to question 
the previously unthematized foundations of social life. Within Ònormal politicsÓ narrative 
stabilizes societal structures by ordering the human experience of events through time. These 
unconscious frameworks, which Habermas (1984/1987: 70) refers to as the lifeworld 
(Lebenswelt), form the horizon of Òmore or less diffuse, always unproblematic background 
convictionsÓ of a community, storing the Òinterpretive work of preceding generations.Ó 
Benjamin (1977: 261) argues that historical ruptures allow actors to Òwrest tradition away 
from a conformism that is about to overpower it.Ó 
Second, Benjamin observes that such breaks are not caused by a single event. On the 
contrary, a rupture is the product of a series of experiences, which slowly crack the 
foundations of the lifeworld. In a particularly poignant image, he describes the European 
crisis of the interwar years as Òa chain of eventsÓ that is unified into Òone single catastrophe 
which keeps piling wreckage upon wreckageÓ (1977: 257). In answer to AdornoÕs dilemma 
regarding the simultaneous need for and dangers of tradition, Benjamin suggests that tragic 
events unified into a single rupture destroy the coherence of existing traditions while also 
providing the community with the resources to establish new forms of life. 
In this vision, ruptures are necessarily violent. In clashing together, the past and the 
future destroy narrative, leaving only fragments of the past behind. While this frees 
individuals and communities from teleological philosophies of history, it also breaks the webs 
of narrative that had supported their conscious self-understandings. Benjamin (1977: 262) 
notes that revolutionary moments make Òthe continuum of history explodeÓ by developing 
new calendars and highlighting new moments as meaningful for the present. 
Arendt used these reflections to develop a historiography that saves the human capacity 
for spontaneous initiative from mechanistic conceptions of causation (1978: 195-213). She 
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argues that traumatic events have the potential to tear tradition asunder, creating a gap 
between past and future. This creates a hiatus between the Òno-moreÓ and the Ònot-yet,Ó when 
thinkers and actors have the opportunity to set the foundations of a new world. Arendt (1977a: 
51) compares this process to the actions of a pearl diver, who searches the depths for bits and 
pieces of the past that have Òundergone a sea-changeÓ and then Òbring[s] them up into the 
world of the living.Ó This approach has a liberating quality, preserving the memory of the 
dead without being enslaved to it. 
ArendtÕs narrative account of constructive power, combined with her understanding of 
historical rupture, shows how communal crises of self-understanding can unleash the critical 
potential of memory. Although it is usually a source of stability, communal experiences of 
rupture break the established connection between past and future. The fragmentation of 
narrative unleashes the Arendtian power of natality to Òstart anewÓ within the kairos of 
liturgical time. 
BenjaminÕs colleagues at the Institute for Social Research also took up these ideas. For 
example, Adorno (1986: 125) argues collective memory raised the issue of democratic 
education, as ÒEnlightenment about what happened in the past must work, above all, against a 
forgetfulness that too easily goes along with and justifies what is forgotten.Ó Conversely Ð and 
more in line with BenjaminÕs own messianic tendencies Ð Horkheimer (1970) links memory 
to the Òyearning for the wholly otherÓ (die Sehnsucht nach dem ganz Anderen), which allows 
individuals to imagine a better future. This not only involves rearranging and reinterpreting 
formative experiences. It is also a process of (re)discovery, as events that were previously 
forgotten are reinvigorated and given new meaning. 
For his part, Marcuse (1937: 126) argues, ÒCritical theory has engaged with the past in 
such unheard of dimensions precisely because it cares about the future.Ó Reflecting on the 
past is crucial because it gives individuals a different, potentially critical perspective on the 
present. Ò[T]he restoration of memory goes hand in hand with the restoration of the cognitive 
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content of the imagination [Phantasie]. [É] The recherche du temps perdu becomes a vehicle 
of future liberationÓ (Marcuse, 1955: 24ff). Despite the horrors of the past, hope for the future 
exists because of the faculty of human imagination.  
Once unleashed, the ability to imagine a different future can help individuals create new 
forms of politics. Marcuse (1964: 101-2) argues, ÒRemembrance of the past may give rise to 
dangerous insights, and the established society seems to be apprehensive of the subversive 
contents of memory.Ó Memory allows individuals to think beyond the limits imposed by 
present institutions, thus empowering them to realize MarxÕs dictum by Òmaking their own 
history.Ó 
After breaks in historical time, collective memory not only frees individuals to rethink 
and reinterpret their own experience; it also allows them to reframe communal narratives by 
drawing on events that lie beyond their individual experience. Reacting to WeberÕs claims 
about the effects of the past on present behavior, Maurice Merleau-Ponty (1955: 2) used the 
phrase the Òimagination of historyÓ to describe ability of the retrospective observer to gather 
together different historical events and strands of thought. By tying these together in the 
present, the observer not only brings these different elements into contact with each other but 
is also able to reveal in them an altogether different meaning than what they stood for in the 
original context. The ability of memory to expand the imaginary scope of individuals is 
crucial to understanding its importance for postwar Europe. 
 
The Communal Nature of Rupture 
I have argued that historical ruptures have the power to unleash the critical potential of 
memory by breaking apart existing narratives. This begs the question of what counts as a 
rupture and why. To a certain extent this varies by individual. For example, the experience of 
the interwar years and the start of a Second World War was enough to trigger a rupture for 
Benjamin before his suicide in 1940. Similarly, Arendt focuses on the decline of human 
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plurality within the corporatist, totalitarian states after the Great War. By contrast, the 
Holocaust Ð particularly the image of Auschwitz Ð is central for Adorno and his colleagues. 
A rupture must be widely recognized as such if it is to break apart existing narratives, 
opening a new, critical perspective on society. It should also exhibit both of the characteristics 
of rupture I have identified above. The events that create this caesura between past and future 
must enter their collective memory as a single break. The rupture must become part of 
collective memory, presenting the past to communities as a task, as a call for change. 
In order to have this effect, the experience of rupture cannot be seen as the product of 
the exogenous force of nature.3 Individuals and the communities are unlikely to consider 
making fundamental changes to collective narratives in response to events over which they 
believe they have no control. By contrast, if traumatic experiences are seen as emanating from 
within the structure of a community, then they can be interpreted as necessitating a 
fundamental rethinking of the meaning of the past for the future. 
The interpretation of traumatic events as a historical rupture is often contested. This 
raises the question of agency. While everyone in a society can accept or reject a new historical 
interpretation, not all individuals have equal influence. Political leaders and cultural elites can 
take advantage of their access to mass media and the institutions of the state Ð such as the 
school system Ð to shape societal viewpoints by channeling type 2 power (Shain, 2010: 13).  
The role of Òmemory entrepreneursÓ (Jelin et al., 2003: 33-6) is important in the process 
of constructing new stories out of the scattered shards that remain after a historical rupture. 
Political leaders and other elites can act as agenda setters, advocates, inventors of innovative 
policy options and deal brokers. This is especially true of individuals who come to power by 
interpreting traumatic events as a historical rupture (Smith, 2003: 35). Because these events 
have destroyed the Òwebs of narrativeÓ that individuals and the community as a whole had 
previously depended on, such leaders are free to reassemble the fragments of the past into 
new narratives. 
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This perspective is not intended to demean the agency of the people. Political leaders 
and other cultural elites are always constrained by what narratives the people will accept 
(Benhabib, 2002: 102). If their understanding of the past fails to resonate, new agents telling 
different stories will come to the fore. This gives elites a strong interest in listening and 
responding to narratives that their constituents find to be meaningful. 
The need for traumatic events to be interpreted as a rupture, not an exogenous shock, 
can be illustrated by examining the differing reactions to the events of the two World Wars on 
the continent. As Jay Winter (2006: 49) points out, ÒÔNever againÕ is a term we now associate 
with the Holocaust; but the phrase was on the lips of millions of men and women a generation 
earlier.Ó The cataclysm of the Great War brought many new ideas to the fore, leading to the 
founding of the League of Nations, the writing of a liberal-democratic constitution of the 
Weimar Republic and the signing Kellogg-Briand Pact outlawing war. Although certain 
interwar leaders supported these initiatives, they were unable to garner enough support from 
the people to see them through, often losing office in the process. As a result, none of these 
projects succeeded. 
While the Great War rocked the foundations of European society, it was not yet enough 
to rupture the historical narratives of the old continent. Instead of leading to a rethinking of 
the past, the Great War reinforced existing cycles of hatred, especially Franco-German 
tensions. The failure of 1918 to change fundamental aspects of the international system can be 
demonstrated in the fact that despite their internationalist rhetoric, the states of Europe soon 
returned to the Òtime-honored core of international diplomacyÓ (Winter, 2006: 49). 
In contrast to the return to tradition of the interwar years, World War II is a historical 
rupture. The Second World War was not merely a repeat of the horrors of the Great War. It 
brought not only destruction on a far greater scale, but also the industrial production of death 
at the Nazi extermination camps. Narratives glorifying the nationÕs exploits became stale 
(Frei, 2008: 81). The old traditions linking experience and expectation had been pulled apart. 
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A new generation of political leaders, including Robert Schuman, Konrad Adenauer, Alcide 
De Gasperi and Henri Spaak Ð who were all born within a few years of each other Ð came to 
power and were able to implement new ideas based on the interpretation of the past as a 
historical break. 
The fact that such a break must be shared and interpreted Òin concertÓ (Arendt, 1998) 
highlights the importance of historical generations. On a basic level, the members of 
generational cohort can be defined by the fact that they share Òforms of knowledge [that] 
become available to us only as a result of certain historical experiencesÓ (Benhabib, 2002: 
135). Although generations are never in full agreement regarding their interpretation of the 
past, they are defined by their search for an answer to questions that arise from the authentic 
experiences that defined their lives. 
The difficulty in defining generations emanates from the fact that they must account for 
both the objective and subjective dimensions of experience. In trying to understand the 
generational dynamics of Weimar Germany, Karl Mannheim developed a framework that 
seeks to bridge this divide by focusing on how and why generational experiences arise in the 
first place. On one hand, he (1952: 291) argues that the temporal and spatial location of birth 
is an objective fact, which predisposes individuals to Òa certain characteristic mode of thought 
and experience, and a characteristic type of historical action.Ó 
On the other hand, these social factors do not guarantee the formation of a self-
conscious generation. The objective experiences of a generation only become salient after 
they have been actively thematized. In other words, generations become aware of themselves 
when events shake them out of their received categories of interpretation. This destabilization 
forces them to search for new categories that can help them make sense of the new 
circumstances in which they find themselves. These Òfundamental integrative attitudes and 
formative principlesÓ (Mannheim, 1952: 305) form the basis for a generation that sees itself as 
experiencing a historical rupture that no longer allows them to merely follow traditional 
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norms within existing institutions. The shared generational experiences of postwar European 
leaders such as Schuman, Adenauer, De Gasperi and Spaak made them Òanxious not to repeat 
the mistakes of the interwar period and to progress as quickly as possibleÓ (Robert Marjolin 
quoted in Wells, 2011: 95; see Verovšek, 2014a). 
 
Conclusion 
Drawing on the work of Arendt and the first generation of the Frankfurt School, I have 
argued that collective memory can be deployed as a constructive resource in the aftermath of 
historical ruptures. Although I opposed this reading to the more dominant destructive reading 
of collective memory as a driver of social conflict, no understanding of the past is truly 
ÒpositiveÓ or Ònegative.Ó While memory can occasionally be constructive, it often also has 
destructive consequences. It is not a question of remembering or forgetting, but of 
remembering and forgetting. As Arendt (1998: 237-40) points out, our capacity to promise, 
which is premised on memory, must be balanced by faculty of forgiveness, which can erase 
past promises, freeing us to once again Òbegin anewÓ with a clean slate. 
Shared generational experiences Ð combined with the arguments of memory 
entrepreneurs Ð are crucial in furthering the interpretation of traumatic events as a historical 
rupture. Despite their many philosophical disagreements, Arendt and the thinkers of the 
Frankfurt School all saw the events of 1914 through 1945 as constituting a historical rupture. 
However, they differed greatly in their interpretations of what changes this rupture ought to 
bring about. 
For Horkheimer and Adorno, the caesura of 1945 required a rethinking of all aspects of 
civilization, including the philosophical tradition of reason, going back to ancient Greece. In 
the Dialectic of Enlightenment (1944) they maintain that Òprogress is reverting to regression,Ó 
as the Òthe wholly enlightened earth [has come to] radiate with triumphant calamityÓ (2002: 
28, 1). Because science, technology, reason and modern forms of social life have been 
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polluted by an all-encompassing instrumental reason, Horkheimer and Adorno argue that 
Òonly authentic works of at have been able to avoid mere imitation of what already isÓ (2002: 
13). By contrast, their colleague Herbert Marcuse rejected this politically quietist stance, 
choosing instead to engage with the student protests of the 1960s and becoming the 
intellectual doyen of the New Left in the United States. 
Although she agreed with the critical theorists of the Frankfurt School that the events of 
World War II constituted a historical rupture, Arendt had a much more hopeful reading of the 
potential of postwar society. Arendt saw great potential in the postwar European movement to 
unify the continent. She (1994: 416-7) was supportive of the Òvery healthy and necessary 
efforts to federate the European nationsÓ (see Verovšek, 2014b). Despite her critiques of 
technology and the increasingly economic focus of politics in modernity, in 1958 she 
described Europe as Òa totally god forsaken place except for the presence of the Coal and 
Steel CommunityÓ (quoted in Kohler and Saner, 1993: 351). 
Regardless of these different interpretations of what needed to be done, all of these 
thinkers saw the events of the Second World War as constituting a historical rupture. 
Subsequent political developments, especially the widening and deepening of the European 
Union, have followed the prescriptions of Arendt more closely than the wholesale rejection of 
modernity presented by Horkheimer and Adorno (Verovšek, 2015). The extent to which these 
changes in political life have addressed the social pathologies that led to the horrific events of 
EuropeÕs age of total war is an open question. However, the success of integration after 1945 
compared with the spectacular failure of similar initiatives after World War I, illustrates the 
transformative power of historical ruptures as opportunities to constructively rethink the 
future based on the lessons of the past. It demonstrates the profound power of collective 
memory to frame how individuals and communities understand and interpret politics outside 
the numerical data points that define so much of modern political analysis. 
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1 I have retranslated Erlebnis and Erfahrung using the nouns ÒeventÓ and ÒexperienceÓ to 
emphasize the personal import of the latter over the mere occurrence of the former. 
2 Other concepts of power also exist, including a Gramscian notion that structures the 
symbolic and material field on which actors operate and a Foucaultian understanding that 
permeates human action and knowledge. However, given my focus on political interactions, I 
set these aside here. 
3 I thank a reviewer from this journal for highlighting this point. 
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